US Midterms 2026: The Non-Resident Reading

The United States voted on Tuesday 3 November. By the time I write this, on Thursday 5 November, the result is roughly two days old, the Democratic Party has control of the Senate, control of the House appears to have gone the same way, and a number of individual races have still not been called. Every outlet on earth published a midterms explainer this week. What I have not seen published is a reading for the people this firm actually advises: readers who are not American, readers who are American and living abroad, and readers who hold dollar assets from outside the United States.

That is what follows. It begins with what is known and what is not, because on a result this fresh the distinction is the whole of the value. I have taken every figure in this article from a source I read while writing it, and where sources disagree I have said so rather than picking the one that reads best.

What actually happened on 3 November, and what is still uncertain

The Democratic Party won control of the Senate, and on Wednesday was widely described as having taken the House as well. The precise numbers were not settled when I wrote this, and I am not going to state them as though they were.

Here is the state of the reporting, with dates attached, because the dates matter more than usual. Associated Press wire copy published at 11:46 pm Eastern on 3 November stated that "Democrats have retaken control of the U.S. Senate" while saying in the same breath that "the House remains too early to call," with Democrats having flipped seven seats at that point. By Wednesday 4 November, CNBC was describing Democrats as having secured control of both chambers, and its Election Desk projection published at 8:15 pm Eastern that evening put Democrats on at least 250 House seats against at least 165 for Republicans, and at least 54 Senate seats against at least 42. The same CNBC report noted that as of late Wednesday nine House seats remained uncalled by the AP, along with two Senate races — Alaska and Mississippi — and two governorships.

Those two accounts are about twenty hours apart and they do not say the same thing, which is exactly what you would expect two days after a national election and is the reason I am reporting both rather than averaging them. The Mississippi Senate race illustrates how provisional this still is: CNBC, citing AP figures, had Scott Colom leading Cindy Hyde-Smith by 65 votes out of 945,587 cast, with an estimated 95% counted.

Three further points of process, each of which matters for anything that follows. Hakeem Jeffries formally launched his bid for Speaker on Wednesday in a letter to colleagues, and CNBC described him as poised to take the post, though that is CNBC's assessment and not a House vote. The Speaker is elected when the new Congress is seated, which CNBC reports as 3 January. And so the single most important fact for a reader trying to work out what this means for their money is a calendar fact: the Congress elected on 3 November does not exist yet. It cannot pass anything, hold a hearing or confirm an appointment before January. Almost nothing discussed as a Democratic priority this week is announced policy, let alone legislation, let alone law.

Why divided government usually means that nothing passes

The honest reading of a divided government, for an investor, is that the policy outlook just became less eventful.

With one party holding Congress and the other the presidency, the ordinary legislative route requires agreement between them. Where there is no agreement, the default is continuity: existing statutes stay on the books, existing rates stay at their existing levels, and the areas of US law that reach internationally mobile families — citizenship-based taxation, the estate tax rules for non-residents, the reporting regimes — carry on unchanged because changing them requires a bill that can pass both chambers and be signed.

This cuts in both directions, and I want to be careful to say so. Readers hoping for a measure that would help them should not count on it. Readers fearing a measure that would hurt them have the same reason not to count on it. Jay Woods, chief market strategist at Freedom Capital Markets, was quoted by CNBC on Wednesday saying that "there will be gridlock and historically this is good for the market." I record that as one market participant's characterisation of a historical pattern, attributed to him; it is not my prediction and it is not advice.

What divided government does change is the non-legislative machinery: oversight, hearings, subpoenas, confirmations and the appropriations process. Reported Democratic priorities this week included health-care tax credits, Medicaid, housing tax credits, immigration enforcement oversight, the federal minimum wage, congressional stock trading and artificial intelligence rules. I list them as reported priorities, which is all they are at this stage. Note also how few of them would reach a non-resident at all. A rise in the federal minimum wage, to take the clearest case, does not touch a reader in Dubai, Johannesburg or Singapore in any way.

Does the result change the tariffs?

Not the ones that are actually in force, and not by congressional action alone. This is the part of the story most worth getting right, and most coverage runs two different things together.

What was struck down. On 20 February 2026 the Supreme Court held, 6-3, in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act does not authorise the President to impose tariffs. The Chief Justice wrote for the Court. The decision invalidated both categories of IEEPA tariff: the "reciprocal" or "Liberation Day" tariffs imposed under Executive Order 14257, and the tariffs on Canada, Mexico and China connected to drug trafficking.

What survived, and is still being collected. The ruling concerned one statute. It did not touch Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act 1962, the national security route, or Section 301 of the Trade Act 1974, the unfair-trade-practices route. Miller Nash's July 2026 analysis states it flatly: those rulings "do not alter Section 232 or Section 301 tariffs, which remain in effect." Baker Donelson said the same, and Brookings scholars made the same point in February, one noting that many US tariffs on Chinese goods rest on authorities such as Section 232 rather than IEEPA.

On the Section 232 side, Miller Nash describes an April 2026 proclamation applying 50% to primary steel, aluminium and copper products and certain closely related derivatives, 25% to certain copper articles and selected derivatives, and a combined 15% rate through 31 December 2027 for specified metal-intensive industrial and grid equipment, rising to 25% thereafter. Thomson Reuters gives 50% for most countries on steel and aluminium with 25% for the United Kingdom. Those two accounts are not identical and I have not been able to reconcile them, so treat the exact rate applying to a particular product as something to check against the tariff schedule rather than something to take from any article, including this one.

The part of the story that sits in between. After the IEEPA ruling the administration imposed a 10% global tariff under Section 122 of the Trade Act 1974, effective 24 February 2026. Section 122 is a time-limited authority: it runs for 150 days and caps the rate at 15%. Miller Nash reports that the Court of International Trade held the enabling proclamation ultra vires on 7 May 2026 and granted permanent injunctive relief to the importer plaintiffs; Thomson Reuters adds that the government appealed. Separately, the authority was due to expire on 24 July 2026 absent an act of Congress, and the sources I read report no extension. So Section 122 is no longer the operative route, though whether that is because a court stopped it or because the clock ran out is reported inconsistently, and I would not assert either.

I also found a single source — a logistics firm rather than a law or tax practice — reporting new Section 301 tariffs of 10% to 12.5% in force since 24 July 2026 on most US trading partners, excluding USMCA-compliant goods and goods already covered by Section 232. Because that rests on one weaker source, I note it as reported and would not plan around it without checking the tariff schedule.

Why Congress cannot simply undo this. The surviving tariffs rest on authority Congress delegated to the executive decades ago. Using that authority needs no fresh congressional vote. Taking it back, or narrowing it, would require a statute — and under Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution a statute needs the President's signature, or a two-thirds majority in both chambers to override a veto. Two-thirds is 290 of 435 House seats and 67 of 100 Senate seats. On CNBC's Election Desk projection of 4 November — at least 250 House seats and at least 54 Senate seats — the arithmetic falls short of both. The realistic expectation is oversight, hearings and votes that make a point, not repeal.

What this means outside the United States. If you import into the US, sell into it, or sit anywhere in a supply chain that crosses its border, the tariff position is roughly what it was last week and is not about to be legislated away. The input costs that a Section 232 metals tariff puts into a manufactured good are still there. We have written separately about one example of how companies respond to this by moving, in our piece on Indian firms pivoting to the UAE as US tariffs disrupt exports.

Refunds, for anyone who paid IEEPA duties. US Customs and Border Protection runs a refund process through a system known as CAPE, launched in April 2026 and opened in phases: unliquidated entries and recent liquidations from 20 April 2026, entries flagged for reconciliation from 29 June, and older liquidated entries from 6 October. The important practical point, on which my sources agree, is that refunds are not automatic — the importer of record or its broker must submit the affected entries. Quoted totals vary so wildly that I will not give a single figure: one source, citing WilmerHale, put IEEPA duties collected at about $35.46 billion across roughly 8.3 million entries, while Thomson Reuters cited a Penn Wharton estimate of $166 billion to $179 billion in scope across more than 333,000 importers. Those are measuring different things, and possibly measuring them badly. If your business paid these duties, this is a question for your customs broker, with a deadline attached.

What a one-day market move does and does not tell you

Wednesday was a large day in US markets. It was also one day, and I am not going to present it as a verdict on anything.

On CNBC's figures for Wednesday 4 November: the Dow Jones Industrial Average rose 1,569.40 points, or 3.03%, to close at 53,356.12; the S&P 500 added 1.58% to 7,688.62; and the Nasdaq Composite gained 1.44% to 25,736.51. Treasury yields were lower, though CNBC's own entries that day are inconsistent about how much, giving the ten-year at about 4.93% in one place and 4.902% in another. Gold rose about 2.9%, quoted premarket at $4,043.45 an ounce, and silver 4.44% to $51.98. Outside the United States the picture was mixed rather than uniform: the CSI 300 gained 2.31% and Korea's Kospi 0.62%, European indices rose modestly in early trade with the Stoxx 600 up 0.44% and the FTSE 100 up 0.22%, while Japan's Nikkei 225 closed 1.42% lower at 62,188.63 and Australia's ASX 200 fell 0.59%.

Note what the brief I was given warned about and what I found to be true: reported figures for the same day genuinely differ between outlets. The Dow's move was variously described as 1,200 points, more than 1,500 points and 1,569.40 points. I have used CNBC's close and named it, which is the only honest way to handle it.

The interpretation offered by market commentators that week was that divided government restrains federal borrowing and spending, which bonds liked. That is a characterisation by market participants, and I pass it on as theirs. One day's trading after a political event is among the least informative data series in finance. Positions were unwound, hedges were lifted, and some of the move had nothing to do with the election at all — as the next section shows.

What it means for US interest rates

Less than most readers will assume, because the direction of US monetary policy in 2026 has already surprised nearly everyone, and the election did not change the committee that sets it.

I want to be plain here, because this is where I would have been wrong from memory. The Federal Reserve has not been cutting rates through 2026. On its own record: the Committee raised the target range by a quarter point to 3.75–4.00% on 16 September 2026 — its first increase since July 2023 — and then held it there on 28 October by a 10-2 vote, with Lisa Cook and Beth Hammack both dissenting because they wanted a further increase. The October statement says that "Economic activity is expanding at a strong pace," that "Job gains have kept pace with the workforce, and the unemployment rate has changed little," and that "Inflation remains elevated." The Chair is Kevin Warsh, who took office on 22 May 2026 for a four-year term; Jerome Powell served as chair pro tempore until Warsh was sworn in and remains a member of the Board. The next meeting is 8-9 December 2026.

Two consequences for readers outside the United States. First, US rates are the anchor for a great deal else — mortgage pricing, gilt and bond yields, the discount rate applied to long-duration assets everywhere. A Fed that has just raised and is being pressed by two of its own members to raise again is a different environment from the one most commentary written in 2025 assumed, and it is worth checking whether your own assumptions were last updated against the facts or against the mood. Second, Congress does not set interest rates. Whatever the new Congress does from January, monetary policy is decided by the Federal Open Market Committee, and a midterm result does not change its composition. For the longer background on how US rate decisions transmit to everyone else, our earlier piece on how US Federal Reserve rate decisions affect the global economy sets out the mechanism, though it was written in a cutting cycle and the direction has since reversed.

The dollar: the channel that actually reaches your life

For most of our readers the dollar matters more than every other item in this article combined, because it sets the real value of a salary, a pension, a school fee or a property in the currency you actually spend. And the one-day move tells you nothing.

Here are both numbers, so you can see the difference in scale. On Wednesday 4 November the ICE dollar index fell 0.39% to 101.32, with the euro up 0.39% at $1.1235 and sterling up 0.48% at $1.3476, on CNBC's figures. Now set that against the Federal Reserve's own nominal broad dollar index, which I took from the Fed's H.10 release: it stood at 119.61 on 2 January 2026 and 121.67 on 30 October 2026 — a rise of about 1.7% over the year — having ranged between a low of 117.44 on 29 January and a high of 122.00 on 14 October. For context, the same index fell about 7.5% during 2025, from 129.46 to 119.75.

So the dollar has been slightly stronger across 2026 after a markedly weaker 2025, and the post-election session moved it by a fraction of a percent on a different index. Anyone describing Wednesday as a dollar verdict is describing a rounding error in the year. Thierry Wizman of Macquarie Group was quoted that day saying that "any politically driven slowdown would be adverse for the [U.S. dollar]" — a conditional observation by a strategist, which I pass on as his and not as a forecast.

The practical point is the unexciting one. If a meaningful part of your income arrives in one currency and your commitments fall due in another, that mismatch is worth understanding on your own figures, and it was worth understanding last week too. It does not become more or less urgent because of an election. Our income and expenditure calculator is a reasonable way to see the shape of the exposure, and the take-home pay calculator helps frame the income side, though neither is a substitute for advice on your actual position.

Oil, the Iran war and energy prices

The largest single market move on Wednesday was in oil, and it had more to do with a war than with the election.

I have to be careful here, because this conflict postdates what I can verify from memory and I am relying entirely on what I could read this week. CNBC reported on 4 November that US crude lost 8.3% to close at $88.12 a barrel and Brent shed 8.7% to settle at $94.62, with oil futures down more than 14% across the week, and described a conflict between the United States and Iran that "has disrupted global energy supplies for eight months."

The link to the election was made by politicians, and I report it as attribution rather than causation. Vice President JD Vance posted on 4 November that "The reason we lost is the war," adding "The president himself said so last night." Asked about those comments at the White House the same day, President Trump called them "largely true," while saying: "If I had it to do again, I'd have to do it again because long term, it's the only answer. You can't let Iran have a nuclear weapon." An ABC News Voter Poll found 34% of US House voters describing the war in Iran as "crucial" to their vote, against 49% for the cost of living and 55% for government corruption. I set those out as what was said and what was measured; the question of who is right about why an election went the way it did is not one a wealth adviser should be answering.

What the oil market appeared to be pricing is a separate matter, and the analysts quoted did not agree. Andy Lipow of Lipow Oil Associates said that "the elections are leading the market to conclude that Trump might now be inclined to make a deal." Bob McNally of Rapidan Energy took the other side: "Trump, having now paid a huge price for his determination to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, is unlikely to let go of this legacy goal and walk away." Rebecca Babin of CIBC noted that many observers had expected a Democratic win to push toward escalation, and that "Vance's commentary and the public lack of backing from key allies have challenged that assumption." When three experienced analysts read the same day in three directions, the appropriate conclusion is that the direction is not known.

Why this reaches an expatriate reader more directly than most items here: energy prices feed into the cost of living everywhere, not only in the United States, and they do so through freight, utilities and food as well as at the pump. The Strait of Hormuz has historically carried roughly a quarter of seaborne traded oil — the US Energy Information Administration put flows in 2022 and the first half of 2023 at more than one-quarter of the global seaborne total, and about 21 million barrels a day in 2022 — so disruption there is a global cost-of-living event rather than an American one.

For the background to the conflict's effect on energy markets, we published a fuller analysis of the 2026 Iran conflict and its transmission to energy supply and inflation-sensitive assets in March, and a piece on how the 2026 energy shock reset market assumptions in May. Both were written months before this week's result and should be read as the record at their dates rather than as a current position.

Is the Strait of Hormuz open or closed?

Neither word is accurate. As at 5 November 2026 the Strait is passable, is being transited, and is under near-daily attack, with traffic far below normal — and the gap between "passable" and "normal" is where most of the confusion in the coverage sits.

I can be more precise here than I expected to be, because the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations centre publishes its numbered warnings openly. UKMTO is the body merchant shipping in the region actually reports incidents to, and it describes itself as the primary point of contact for emergency response. Its recent incident list, which I read on 5 November 2026, carried 52 reports numbered 143 to 195 and dated between 29 September and 4 November 2026. Of those, 43 are classified as attacks and 29 refer to the Strait of Hormuz. Five fall in November alone, every one of them an attack: warning 191 on 1 November, warnings 192 and 193 on 2 November, warning 194 on 3 November and incident 195 on 4 November — an attack reported on each of the four days spanning the US election.

Two things follow, and they cut against the headlines in opposite directions.

Ships are moving through. UKMTO's own wording repeatedly describes vessels in mid-passage. A crude oil tanker was struck "whilst completing an outbound transit of the Strait of Hormuz" on 31 October. A tanker hit by a projectile on 22 October "was able to continue its voyage to the next port of call." A tanker approached on 29 October by a small boat that attached two explosive devices to its hull suffered an engine-room fire that temporarily disabled it, and UKMTO's update records that the fire was extinguished and the "vessel is continuing to its next port of call." An Indian-crewed dhow was attacked "whilst sailing outbound through the Strait of Hormuz" on 3 November, its surviving crew rescued by the Omani Royal Navy. UKMTO's standing advice throughout is that "Vessels are advised to transit with caution" — guidance on how to pass, not notice that passage has stopped. No maritime authority I could reach declares the Strait closed.

But the volume is a fraction of normal, and nobody can tell you precisely what fraction. Open-source tracking projects describe the Strait as effectively closed to commercial traffic and count the closure in days. Their underlying figures are thinner than the confident headlines suggest: one cites IMF PortWatch recording two transits on 25 October against a typical 85 a day. These are projects whose operators are not identified rather than official bodies, so I report the characterisation as theirs and not as a finding. More to the point, every transit count in this conflict is a floor rather than a total, because vessels are sailing with transponders switched off — one tracker, citing the maritime analytics firm Windward, put 37% of transits dark in the week to 30 September. A count that cannot see a third of the traffic cannot establish that the traffic stopped.

One measurement trap worth knowing about. Two very different oil-flow figures are circulating and are being quoted interchangeably. A number above 24 million barrels a day describes flows across the wider Gulf system, including bypass pipelines, Red Sea exports and ship-to-ship transfers. A number around 7.3 million barrels a day describes crude that physically sails through the Strait, for the week to 28 October. Only the second is Strait flow. Anyone offering the first as evidence that Hormuz is working normally is comparing two different things, and the error runs in the reassuring direction — which is the direction in which errors are most expensive.

For the official record on consequences rather than on status, the US Energy Information Administration is both citable and dated. In an article of 3 November 2026 it attributed a fall of 4.8 million barrels a day in global refinery inputs — about 6% — in the second quarter of 2026 to the conflict that began in late February, noting that "the closure of the strait significantly limited the export of refined products," and described the third quarter as seeing increased flows through the Strait alongside alternative routes and ship-to-ship transfers. Its 5 October 2026 article records Brent futures opening the third quarter at $72 a barrel on 1 July, passing $100 on 23 July and peaking at $109 on 15 September, with spot prices reaching as high as $132.

That last figure is the one to hold in mind when reading Wednesday's move. Brent settling at $94.62 is a long way below a spot peak of $132 and a long way above where the year began. One session does not tell you which of those two it is travelling towards, and I am not going to guess.

If you hold US shares or US property from outside the United States

Nothing in the election changes this, and it is the item on which I see the most expensive misunderstandings. US federal estate tax reaches non-Americans who hold US-situated assets, at a threshold most people assume must be far higher than it is.

The figures, from the Internal Revenue Service and the Internal Revenue Code rather than from commentary. An executor for a decedent who was a non-resident and not a US citizen must file Form 706-NA if the date-of-death value of the decedent's US-situated assets exceeds $60,000. The maximum unified credit available against the resulting tax is $13,000, under section 2102(b)(1) of the Code. The top rate in the unified rate schedule at section 2001(c) is 40%. By contrast, the filing threshold for a deceased US citizen or domiciliary in 2026 is $15,000,000. The gap between $60,000 and $15 million is the whole point, and it catches people who have never thought of themselves as having a US tax problem.

One correction to how this is usually described, including in the note that commissioned this article: the $60,000 is a filing threshold, not an exemption, and the credit is $13,000. The two happen to correspond — the tentative tax on $60,000 under the rate schedule works out at $13,000 — but they are different things, and the precision matters when you are the one computing it.

What counts as US-situs is specific, and some of it is counter-intuitive:

• Shares in US-incorporated companies are US-situs, and the instructions to Form 706-NA are explicit that this holds "no matter where stock certificates are physically located." Holding US shares through a non-US broker does not change it.
• US real estate and tangible personal property are US-situs if physically located there.
• A deposit with a US bank that is not effectively connected with a US trade or business is treated as located outside the United States.
• Proceeds of life insurance on the decedent's life are treated as located outside the United States.
• Debt obligations of US persons are generally US-situs, but obligations issued after 18 July 1984 whose interest would qualify for exemption under section 871(h)(1) are generally treated as located outside.

Treaties can change the answer substantially. Section 2102(b)(3)(A) provides a pro-rated share of the larger credit where a treaty requires it, and the Form 706-NA instructions list death tax treaties with Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, South Africa, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The UK treaty limits the US estate tax payable on such property; the Canadian arrangement includes a small-estate exemption where the worldwide estate is no more than $1.2 million. Which of these applies, and how, is a question for advice on your own facts and your own country of residence.

Three related rules worth knowing while you are here, all unchanged by the election. A non-resident alien's US-source dividends are subject to a flat 30% withholding, reducible by treaty, with no deductions allowed. Capital gains on US shares are generally not taxed to a non-resident alien who was present in the United States for fewer than 183 days in the tax year, subject to specific exceptions. And on a disposal of US real property by a foreign person, FIRPTA withholding is generally 15% of the amount realised, with the buyer as withholding agent and an exception where the amount realised is $300,000 or less and the property is used as a residence. Non-residents letting US property may also elect under section 871(d) to treat the income as effectively connected, which allows deductions and graduated rates instead of the flat 30% charge.

If any of that is new to you and you hold US-situs assets, the useful response is a review, not a transaction. Our wealth expatriation hub is a starting point, and for American citizens considering a change of tax base we have written at more length on the jurisdictions involved.

If you are an American living abroad, what changes?

On the evidence available, nothing — and I want to argue that this is a substantive answer rather than a shrug.

Citizenship-based taxation, the FATCA reporting architecture, the FBAR requirement and the foreign earned income exclusion all sit in existing statute. Divided government is precisely the condition in which existing statute remains in force. Proposals to move the United States toward residence-based taxation have circulated for years and have never commanded the majorities needed; nothing about this week's result makes that more likely, and a new Congress cannot act before January in any event.

The current figures, from the IRS: the foreign earned income exclusion is $130,000 for 2025 and $132,900 for 2026, with the housing amount limitation at $39,000 and $39,870 respectively, available to those meeting either the bona fide residence test or the physical presence test of 330 full days in a foreign country within any twelve consecutive months. The FBAR is required where the aggregate value of foreign financial accounts exceeded $10,000 at any time during the calendar year — not at year end, which is a distinction that catches people who moved money between accounts. It is filed as FinCEN Form 114 through the BSA E-Filing System, separately from the tax return, due 15 April with an automatic extension to 15 October that requires no request.

So the planning posture for Americans abroad is continuity. If you have been deferring a compliance question in the hope that the rules would change, the evidence this week is that they will not. Our FATCA and FBAR compliance guide for US expats covers the mechanics in more detail.

Emerging markets, capital flows and the rest of the world

This is the section where I have the least to offer, and I would rather say that than fill it.

Dollar strength is the dominant variable for emerging market debt, and therefore for a significant part of our readership in Africa, Latin America and South East Asia: a stronger dollar raises the real cost of dollar-denominated borrowing and tends to tighten financial conditions in economies that did not choose them. The mechanism is well established. What I cannot tell you is where the dollar goes next, and the sources available this week were strikingly inconsistent even about where it has been — I found one asserting that the dollar had wiped out emerging market currencies' 2026 gains and another asserting that it had consistently underperformed against those same currencies this year. Faced with that, I went to the Federal Reserve's own index, which is the basis for the figures in the dollar section above, and I will not go beyond it.

The one thing I can say with confidence is directional in a different sense: a US Congress and a US presidency held by opposing parties historically produce fewer large fiscal changes, and fewer large fiscal changes mean fewer large shocks transmitted outward through the dollar and through Treasury yields. Whether that holds this time is not something I know.

What bites now, what bites in January, and what is only talk

The discipline that applies to any political event applies with extra force to one that is two days old. Distinguish announced from legislated from in force.

In force now, unchanged by the election: Section 232 and Section 301 tariffs; the federal funds target range at 3.75–4.00% as set on 16 September and held on 28 October; the $60,000 Form 706-NA filing threshold and the $13,000 credit for non-resident decedents; the 30% FDAP withholding rate; FIRPTA at 15%; citizenship-based taxation, FATCA and FBAR; the 2026 foreign earned income exclusion of $132,900. None of this is affected by who won.

Cannot happen before 3 January 2027: anything requiring a vote of the new Congress. The chamber that was elected on Tuesday has not been seated, has no committees, no Speaker and no legislative calendar.

Talk, at this stage: the entire reported Democratic legislative agenda. Health-care tax credits, Medicaid, housing credits, minimum wage, congressional stock trading rules, AI legislation and investigations have been reported as priorities. Reported priorities are not bills, bills are not statutes, and a statute still needs a signature or a two-thirds override. I would attach no planning weight to any of it today.

What I would and would not do now

I would check whether anything in this article reaches you at all. That is the single most useful exercise, and for a large share of readers the honest answer is that a US midterm election changes nothing about their position — which is worth knowing with confidence rather than assuming.

I would look properly at US-situs exposure if you hold US shares or US property and are not a US person. The $60,000 filing threshold is the item in this article most likely to be news to a reader, and establishing whether a treaty helps you is a question with a definite answer.

I would revisit currency exposure on its own merits if a real mismatch exists between the currency you earn and the currency you spend — and I would do it using your numbers over a period of years, not Wednesday's close.

I would read this alongside the UK side of the same question. For readers with UK connections, the Autumn Budget 2026 assessment covers what the 28 October Budget did and did not do to non-residents; between them, that piece and this one are the two halves of the policy picture for an internationally mobile family with exposure to both countries. If your UK residence position is also in question, the Statutory Residence Test tool and the UK domicile test are the places to start, and the UK expats hub collects the rest.

I would not change an investment or a currency arrangement because of a one-day market move, and nothing in this article should be read as suggesting otherwise. I would not assume the tariff regime is going away. And I would not wait for legislative relief from any US rule that currently applies to me, because divided government is the circumstance in which rules persist.

What I have left out, and why

Four things, in the interest of being straight about the limits of a piece written two days after the event.

I have not given a seat count as settled fact. The AP had not called House control in the wire copy I read from the night of 3 November, while CNBC described both chambers as won on 4 November and projected at least 250 House and at least 54 Senate seats that evening. Nine House races and two Senate races were still uncalled as of late Wednesday. A number stated confidently today may be wrong by the weekend.

I have not quantified how much traffic is passing through the Strait of Hormuz. I can show from UKMTO's own numbered warnings that vessels are transiting and are being attacked while they do, which is more than I expected to be able to establish. What no source supports is a reliable current transit volume. The counts in circulation are floors rather than totals because ships are running dark, the official maritime authority publishes incidents rather than throughput, and the IMF's chokepoint dashboard was behind a sign-in. So the direction is clear and the magnitude is not, and I have not invented a number to close the gap.

I have given no single figure for IEEPA tariff refunds. The totals I found differ by a factor of roughly five and measure different quantities. Where I cannot reconcile sources, quoting the most impressive number would be the wrong instinct.

I have made no forecast and no recommendation. Not about the dollar, not about US rates, not about any market or security. There is a version of this article that reads Wednesday's rally as a verdict and tells you what to do about it. It would be more satisfying to read and it would look foolish within a fortnight.

How Global Investments can help

Global Investments is an independent international wealth advisory firm with three decades of experience advising internationally mobile families. We are not authorised or regulated by the UK Financial Conduct Authority and cannot provide regulated advice to UK residents in the UK. What we do is help globally mobile clients see their position whole — residence, structuring, pensions and succession together rather than one at a time — working alongside your existing tax and legal advisers rather than replacing them. If you hold US-situs assets, are an American citizen living outside the United States, or simply want to know which parts of this week's news reach you and which do not, that conversation is a short one and worth having.

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This article describes the position as at 5 November 2026, two days after the US midterm elections of 3 November 2026. Election results were provisional at the time of writing and a number of races had not been called; reported seat totals differed between outlets and may have changed since publication. Market figures are single-day observations and are not indicative of any trend. Nothing here is a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any investment or currency, and nothing here is a forecast of any market or exchange rate. Tax treatment depends on individual circumstances, on the law of your country of residence as well as that of the United States, and on applicable treaties, and may change. This is information, not a personal recommendation.

Sources: Associated Press wire copy as republished by PBS NewsHour, Democrats take control of the Senate after winning key midterm races, updated 11:46 pm ET 3 November 2026, for Senate control and the uncalled House. CNBC, Democrats sweep 2026 midterms, published 5:38 pm ET 4 November 2026, and CNBC's 2026 midterm election results live blog, updated 8:15 pm ET 4 November 2026, for the Election Desk seat projections, the uncalled races, the Mississippi margin, the Jeffries speakership bid and the 3 January seating date. CNBC, Stock market today live blog, updated 4:16 pm ET 4 November 2026, for the Dow, S&P 500, Nasdaq, dollar index, euro, sterling, Treasury yield, gold, silver and non-US index figures and for the quotations from Jay Woods of Freedom Capital Markets and Thierry Wizman of Macquarie Group. CNBC, Crude oil prices fall below $90 a barrel as Vance blames GOP election defeat on Iran war, 4 November 2026, for WTI and Brent settlements and the quotations from Andy Lipow of Lipow Oil Associates, Bob McNally of Rapidan Energy and Rebecca Babin of CIBC. ABC News, 4 November 2026, for the Vance and Trump quotations and the ABC News Voter Poll figures. Supreme Court of the United States, Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, decided 20 February 2026, as reported by Thomson Reuters Tax & Accounting and by Brookings, Brookings experts on the Supreme Court's tariff decision, 24 February 2026. Miller Nash LLP, Tariffs in Flux, 8 July 2026, and Baker Donelson, Trade Policy Shifts, updated 5 March 2026, for the survival of Section 232 and Section 301 and the April 2026 metals proclamation. Thomson Reuters Tax & Accounting, After IEEPA: which tariff authorities does the U.S. government still have, 7 July 2026, for Section 122 and the Penn Wharton refund estimate. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FOMC statements of 16 September 2026 and 28 October 2026, the Open Market Operations table, the FOMC calendar and the Board member biographies, for the target range, the vote, the dissents, the policy direction and the chairmanship. Federal Reserve H.10 release of 2 November 2026 and the nominal broad US dollar index series (DTWEXBGS) for the 2026 and 2025 dollar index levels. Internal Revenue Service, Some nonresidents with U.S. assets must file estate tax returns, and the Instructions for Form 706-NA, together with 26 U.S.C. §§ 2101, 2102 and 2001(c), for the $60,000 filing threshold, the $13,000 credit, the situs rules, the 40% top rate and the death tax treaty list. IRS estate tax page for the 2026 filing threshold of $15,000,000. IRS pages on the foreign earned income exclusion, the FBAR, taxation of nonresident aliens, FDAP income, FIRPTA withholding and real property income of nonresident aliens, for the 2025 and 2026 exclusion amounts, the $10,000 FBAR threshold, the 30% FDAP rate, the 183-day capital gains rule and the 15% FIRPTA rate. US Energy Information Administration, The Strait of Hormuz is the world's most important oil transit chokepoint, 21 November 2023, for the share of seaborne traded oil. United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations, recent incidents list and numbered warnings 143 to 195, read on 5 November 2026, for the attack record, the classifications and the quoted transit wording. US Energy Information Administration, Today in Energy, 3 November 2026, for the second-quarter fall in global refinery inputs and the quoted effect of the strait's closure on refined product exports, and 5 October 2026 for the third-quarter Brent futures and spot prices. Figures for current transit counts and Strait oil flow are attributed in the text to the open-source tracking projects that published them, and are reported as their characterisations rather than as established fact; the IMF PortWatch chokepoint dashboard could not be read without signing in. Primary documents have been preferred over commentary for every figure where a primary document was reachable.